



Freedom in the World 2002: The Democracy Gap

The Freedom House Survey Team

THE THREAT OF MASS TERRORISM

As the year 2001 drew to a close, the international community confronted a widespread terrorist threat emanating from a fanatical global revolutionary movement that claimed origins in an extremist interpretation of Islam. While one terror base, the Taliban in Afghanistan, was in the process of being eliminated, the international community faced a troubling future in which dispersed political extremists and movements seek to export terror to stable states and to topple politically brittle or weak Middle Eastern states in their effort to foment an international Islamist revolution.

While turmoil beset parts of the Islamic world and threatened the tranquility of the advanced democracies, the year saw modest trends in the further consolidation of young democracies and the deepening of democratic practices in a wide variety of settings. Democracy and market systems appeared resilient in the face of terrorist and extremist challenges. They remained so because of the strength they and their leaders derive from the sense of ownership citizens have in their governments.

At the same time, Islamist terrorism and the popularity of extremist ideas among segments of the international Muslim community posed a serious threat to the spread of political freedom in the Islamic world. This year's Survey shows a dramatic gap between the levels of freedom and democracy in the Islamic countries—particularly in their Arabic core—and the rest of the world.


THE STATE OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY: 2001

As 2001 drew to a close, the world reached a new watermark in the number and proportion of democratically elected governments, with The Gambia reentering the ranks of electoral democracies. In all 121 of the world's

192 governments (63 percent) are electoral democracies. While some electoral democracies have poor human rights records, fragile, and incomplete democratic institutions, such democracies afford considerable space for political opposition movements, provide opposition parties and viewpoints access to the media, and meet the minimum standard of a relatively fair vote count in conditions of ballot secrecy.

In all, according to the annual survey, *Freedom in the World*, there are 86 Free countries in which basic political rights and civil liberties are recognized (representing 2.54 billion people and 41.40 percent of the global population). There are 58 Partly Free countries in which there is

Status of Freedom in the World



limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. These states also suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys dominance despite the façade of limited pluralism. Approximately 23.25 percent of the world's population, 1.43 billion persons, lives in such Partly Free societies. There are 2.17 billion people (35.35 percent of the global population) living in 48 Not Free countries, where basic political rights are absent and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.

Freedom in the World – 2001-2002

The population of the world as estimated in mid-2001 is 6,130.7 million persons, who reside in 192 sovereign states. The level of political rights and civil liberties as shown comparatively by the Freedom House survey is:

Free: 2,538.2 million (41.40 percent of the world's population) live in 86 of the states.

Partly Free: 1,425.4 million (23.25 percent of the world's population) live in 58 of the states.

Not Free: 2,167.1 million (35.35 percent of the world's population) live in 48 of the states.

A Record of the Survey

(population in millions)

Survey date	Free	Partly free	Not free	World Population
January 1981	1,613.0 (35.90%)	970.9 (21.60%)	1,911.9 (42.50%)	4,495.8
January 1983	1,665.1 (36.32%)	918.8 (20.04%)	2,000.2 (43.64%)	4,584.1
January 1985	1,671.4 (34.85%)	1,117.4 (23.30%)	2,007.0 (41.85%)	4,795.8
January 1987	1,842.5 (37.10%)	1,171.5 (23.60%)	1,949.9 (39.30%)	4,963.9
January 1989	1,992.8 (38.86%)	1,027.9 (20.05%)	2,107.3 (41.09%)	5,128.0
January 1990	2,034.4 (38.87%)	1,143.7 (21.85%)	2,055.9 (39.28%)	5,234.0
January 1991	2,088.2 (39.23%)	1,485.7 (27.91%)	1,748.7 (32.86%)	5,322.6
January 1992 (a)	1,359.3 (25.29%)	2,306.6 (42.92%)	1,708.2 (31.79%)	5,374.2
January 1993	1,352.4 (24.83%)	2,403.3 (44.11%)	1,690.4 (31.06%)	5,446.0
January 1994	1,046.2 (19.00%)	2,224.4 (40.41%)	2,234.6 (40.59%)	5,505.2
January 1995	1,119.7 (19.97%)	2,243.4 (40.01%)	2,243.9 (40.02%)	5,607.0
January 1996	1,114.5 (19.55%)	2,365.8 (41.49%)	2,221.2 (38.96%)	5,701.5
January 1997	1,250.3 (21.67%)	2,260.1 (39.16%)	2,260.6 (39.17%)	5,771.0
January 1998	1,266.0 (21.71%)	2,281.9 (39.12%)	2,284.6 (39.17%)	5,832.5
January 1999 (b)	2,354.0 (39.84%)	1,570.6 (26.59%)	1,984.1 (33.58%)	5,908.7
January 2000	2,324.9 (38.90%)	1,529.0 (25.58%)	2,122.4 (35.51%)	5,976.3
January 2001	2,465.2 (40.69%)	1,435.8 (23.70%)	2,157.5 (35.61%)	6,058.5
January 2002	2,538.2 (41.40%)	1,425.4 (23.25%)	2,167.1 (35.35%)	6,130.7

(a) The large shift in the population figure between 1991 and 1992 is due to India's change from Free to Partly Free

(b) The large shift in the population figure between 1998 and 1999 is due to India's change from Partly Free to Free

COUNTRY TRENDS

The year's trends yielded mixed results, with 17 countries registering significant gains in freedom and 17 registering setbacks for political rights and civil liberties.

Among countries making important gains in freedom were Peru, which reentered the ranks of free countries after open democratic elections that saw the victory of Alejandro Toledo. Peru's democratic gains came after a period of terrorism, instability, and corrupt authoritarian rule of former President Alberto Fujimori. The Gambia's status improved from Not Free to Partly Free after the

government lifted a controversial decree barring opponents from political activity in advance of nationwide elections. Mauritania registered gains and saw its status improve from Not Free to Partly Free as a consequence of local and national parliamentary elections. Additional advances for freedom were registered in Albania, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Grenada, and Yugoslavia.

Among 17 states suffering significant setbacks to freedom were Trinidad and Tobago, which declined from Free to Partly Free as the country's parliamentary system

broke down amid a disputed national election and growing corruption. Liberia, too, saw its status decline to Not Free as a result of persistent repression of political opponents. Under the authoritarian leadership of President Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe entered the ranks of Not Free countries amid widespread violence against the opposition, civil society, and independent media and as the government acted to reduce the independence of the judiciary. Additional substantial declines in freedom occurred in Argentina, Belize, Benin, the Central African Republic,

(46 percent), 10 are Partly Free (26 percent), and 11 are Not Free (28 percent). Despite the looming presence of Communist China and the rhetoric of “Asian values,” 24 (62 percent) of the region’s polities are electoral democracies.

In East-Central Europe and the former U.S.S.R., there is now evidence of a deepening chasm. In Central Europe and parts of Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, democracy and freedom prevail; in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), however, progress toward the emergence of open societies has stalled or failed. Overall, 19 of the 27 post-Communist countries of East-Central Europe and the CIS are electoral democracies (70 percent). In addition, 11 of the region’s states are Free (41 percent), 10 are Partly Free (37 percent), and 6 are Not Free (22 percent). Of the 12 non-Baltic former Soviet republics, 6 countries are Partly Free, 6 are Not Free, and none are Free. Stagnation and reversals for freedom characterized virtually all the non-Baltic Soviet states.

Western Europe remains the preserve of Free countries and democracies, with all 24 states both free and democratic.

Among the 35 countries in the Americas, 32 are electoral democracies (91 percent). In addition, 23 states are rated as Free (66 percent), 10 are Partly Free (28 percent), and 2—Cuba and Haiti—are Not Free (6 percent).

In the 14 Middle Eastern countries (excluding those in North Africa), the roots of democracy and freedom are weakest. In this region there is only one Free country, Israel (7 percent); there are three Partly Free states—Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey (21 percent)—and ten countries that are Not Free (71 percent). Israel and Turkey are the region’s only electoral democracies (14 percent).

**FREEDOM AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD:
THE DEMOCRACY GAP**

Since the early 1970s, when the third major historical wave of democratization began, the Islamic world, and, in particular, its Arabic core have seen little significant evidence of improvements in political openness, respect for human rights, and transparency. Indeed, the democracy gap between the Islamic world and the rest of the world is dramatic. Of the 192 countries in the world today, 121 are electoral democracies; but in countries with an Islamic majority, only 11 of 47 have democratically elected governments, or 23 percent. In the non-Islamic world, there are 110 electoral democracies out of 145 states, over 76 percent. This means that a non-Islamic state is more than three times more likely to be democratic than an Islamic state. There are no electoral democracies among the 16 Arabic states of the Middle East and North Africa.

Global Trend

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free
1991-1992	76	65	42

Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, Jamaica, Jordan, Macedonia, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria and Yemen.

At the end of 2001, there were 121 electoral democracies among the world’s 192 states (63 percent). The 1987-88 survey found just 66 of 167 countries (40 percent) were electoral democracies. In short, the number of new democratically elected governments has increased by 55 over the space of 14 years, an average of nearly four per year. This gradual, sustained expansion of electoral democracy has helped to create a framework for improvements in basic human rights.


REGIONAL PATTERNS

Democracy and freedom are the dominant trends in Western and East-Central Europe, in the Americas, and increasingly in the Asia-Pacific region. In the former Soviet Union, the picture remains mixed, with progress toward freedom stalled and a number of countries consolidating into dictatorships. In Africa, too, Free societies and electoral democracies remain a distinct minority. There are no true democracies or Free countries within the Arab world, and there is a low proportion of Free and democratic Muslim states.

Of the 53 countries in Africa, 9 are Free (17 percent), 25 are Partly Free (47 percent), and 19 are Not Free (36 percent). Only 20 African countries (38 percent) are electoral democracies. Generally, the region continued to be the most dynamic part of the world, but there was little evidence of forward momentum toward greater openness. This year, seven African states registered gains for freedom, while 9 suffered significant setbacks.

In Asia, 18 of the region’s 39 countries are Free

Democracy in the Muslim World




While electoral democracies are the norm in over three-fourth's of the world's non-Islamic states, in countries with a majority Islamic population there are ten presidential-parliamentary democracies and one parliamentary democracy. At the same time, within the Islamic world there are nine countries with authoritarian presidencies, there are seven with dominant party states in which opposition parties are nominal, there are six with presidential-parliamentary systems with features of authoritarian rule, there are nine traditional monarchies, there are three one-party states, there is one military-ruled state, and, until November there was one fundamentalist theocracy, Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban.


THE FREEDOM GAP

There is an even more dramatic freedom gap between majority Islamic countries and the rest of the world. In countries in which there is an Islamic majority, there is just one Free country, Mali, while 18 are rated Partly Free and 28 are Not Free. By contrast, among the non-Islamic countries, 85 are Free, 40 are Partly Free, and 20 are Not Free.

Muslim Majority Countries by Status of Freedom




Democracy in the Non-Muslim World



Twenty years ago, there was also one Free country among states with a majority Islamic population, while there were 20 that were Partly Free and 18 Not Free. By contrast, at the close of 1981, the rest of the world registered 50 Free countries (the majority of them from Europe and North America), 31 Partly Free countries, and 42 Not Free countries.

This means that over a twenty-year period—which also saw the emergence of twenty new states—the number of Free countries in the non-Islamic world increased by 35, the number of Partly Free states grew by 9, while the number of Not Free countries declined by 22. Over this twenty year time frame, diametrically opposite trends were taking place in the Islamic world. The number of Free countries remained stuck at one and the number of Partly Free countries declined by two, while the number of Not Free countries increased by ten. In other words, while the countries of Latin America, Africa, East-Central Europe, and South and East Asia experienced significant gains for democracy and freedom over the last twenty years, the countries of the Islamic world experienced an equally significant increase in repressive regimes.

Non-Muslim Countries by Status of Freedom



These opposite trends have contributed to a growing gap between the Islamic world and the rest of humanity. Indeed, while some posit a clash of civilizations, such a clash is not between the Islamic world and the Judeo-Christian civilization; rather it is on the one hand between the Islamic world and its Middle Eastern core, and on the other between the non-democratic Islamic world (in particular its repressive Arabic core) and the rest of the world.

This dichotomy persists in every region in which Islam has a presence. A look at the political map of Africa is revealing. It shows, for example, that among the majority Islamic countries of the African continent, only one of the 20 countries is rated Free, nine are Partly Free and 10 are Not Free. By contrast, among the non-Islamic countries of Africa, eight are Free, 15 are Partly Free and 10 are Not Free. Similarly, seven of the 20 Muslim African countries are democracies, while 13 of 33 non-Muslim African states have democratically elected governments.

In the non-Islamic countries of East Central Europe and the former USSR, there are 11 Free countries, 9 Partly Free countries and one Not Free country, while among the majority Islamic states in this category, there is one that is rated Partly Free and five that are Not Free.

A similar dichotomy is revealed in Asia, where there are 18 Free countries, 7 Partly Free, and 7 Not Free countries among the non-Islamic countries, while among the Asian countries with a majority Islamic population, none is rated Free, three are Partly Free and four are Not Free.

The weakness of democratic culture and free market beliefs in many of the majority Islamic states, particularly in the Arabic states, as well as the weak democratic discourse within a large part of Islamic civilization contributes to political conflict in multi-denominational settings. In countries like Lebanon, large portions of the Islamic population have been drawn to the appeal and patronage of anti-democratic movements. In Nigeria, a clash has erupted between fundamentalist Islamic forces seeking to impose their version of sharia (Islamic prescriptions related to lifestyle and law) in states where Muslims predominate and pursue policies that violate basic rights, in particular the rights of religious minorities and women. In the Philippines, Islamist ideas have raised tensions on the island of Mindanao and posed a serious threat to security. Similarly, Islamism has provoked a war of genocide against the predominantly Christian and animist African population of Southern Sudan. In 2001, a new insurgency by the Islamic Albanian minority contributed to the deterioration of civil liberties in the democratic state of Macedonia. In Indonesia, Islamic fundamentalism has in recent years fed attacks on predominantly Christian Chinese minorities and threatened the country's democratic transition.

While a number of the more repressive Arabic states—Egypt and Saudi Arabia, most notably—have successfully suppressed Islamist political movements, they have at the same time tolerated the spread of radical fundamentalist ideas to other countries. Moreover, such states have permitted—some say encouraged—the proliferation of anti-Western and anti-US views within their media and by Islamic clerics.

In other states, the Islamist threat has proved real. In Algeria, Islamists nearly captured state power, and when they were thwarted in a military coup proceeded to launch a decade long war of terror that has claimed over 100,000 lives. In Kuwait, which has seen a limited devolution of power to an elected parliament, fundamentalists have captured substantial numbers of seats and are seeking to impose their version of sharia on Kuwaiti society.

The significant threat posed by Islamism in many predominantly Muslim societies and the absence of democratic practices in many Islamic majority states should not obscure the considerable democratic ferment in the Islamic world. Democratic polities are now found in Albania, Bangladesh, Djibouti, the Gambia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Turkey.

Notably, none of these Islamic democracies has a majority Arab population, and all are found in the Islamic periphery in South and East Asia, on the border of Europe and the Caucasus and in Northern and Central Africa. Out of the non-Arabic Islamic countries, 11 of 31 countries are electoral democracies, while none of the 16 majority Arabic countries has democratically elected governments. Among the majority Arabic countries, one, Tunisia, has an authoritarian presidential system, two—Libya and Iraq—are one party dictatorships, and four are states with a dominant ruling party that faces a thwarted and severely circumscribed political opposition (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen). The nine remaining states are monarchies—eight of them Arabic.

Still, recent history shows that Islam is not inherently incompatible with democratic values. Indeed, if we take into account the large Muslim populations of such countries as India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, and the Islamic populations of North America and Western Europe, the majority of the world's Muslims lives under democratically constituted governments.

As significantly, over the last three years, democracy has been restored or has emerged in Albania, Indonesia, and Nigeria. In Islamic Iran, there has been considerable democratic ferment, and it is clear the public is eager to supplant the political dominance of the country's fundamentalist clergy. The Islamic plurality in Bosnia has respected basic democratic norms, and in majority Islamic

Kosovo local elections have confirmed the electoral victory of moderate, pro-democratic secular forces.

FACTORS INHIBITING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

There are of course, many factors that have contributed to the weakness of democracy and freedom in large parts of the Muslim world. Islam has spread to many of the less developed parts of the world, where education and prosperity have also lagged behind. Most of these


public of Iran, united clerical leadership with the political leadership of the state.

Another factor has been the corrosive power of oil and natural gas. The income derived from these commodities has conferred vast riches on a narrow ruling elite. For decades, such revenue has also meant that many Islamic societies have not needed to focus on building the types of viable entrepreneurial and wealth creating economic systems that less resource rich countries have employed to build prosperous societies. Instead they used oil revenues to provide large subventions to their populations, creating a unique form of public welfare that reinforces idleness and suppresses initiative. With oil dividends declining, many Arabic and other oil-rich Islamic states will need to confront harsh choices and take measures that empower individual initiative, build self-sustaining middle classes, and so create a basis for democratic civic life.

Finally, there is the historic legacy. Many of the Arabic states remain narrowly held monarchies, with few features of broader consultation and democratization. The ostentatious economic oligarchies that the monarchies have spawned have created significant resentment and contributed to the appeal of fundamentalist movements.

Many of the remaining Arabic states—Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq—are the heirs to the statist authoritarianism of Arab socialist and secular Ba'athist regimes, whose worldview and systems of mass mobilization derive from such totalitarian models as fascism and communism. These states have suppressed democratic and fundamentalist Islamist movements alike. And they have not undergone the political reforms that occurred in most of the Communist world.

Tracking Democracy



countries are riddled with corruption, cronyism, and are saddled with statist economies that have been unaffected by the market reforms that have swept the rest of the world.

Another factor contributing to the democracy gap has been the cultural burden imposed by an interpretation of Islamic faith and tradition that relegates women to a second class status as worshippers and members of society. The severe limitations placed on women in such countries as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states are grave impediments to their participation in civic life.

A third factor has been the Islamic tradition that merges religion and state. As Bernard Lewis has written, "In Muslim theory, church and state are not separate or separable institutions. . . . Such familiar pairs of words as lay and ecclesiastical, sacred and profane, spiritual and temporal, and the like have no equivalent in classical Arabic or in other Islamic languages, since the dichotomy they express, deeply rooted in Christendom, was unknown in Islam until comparatively modern times."¹ This is not to say that the distinction does not exist in practice. Indeed, of the 47 Islamic polities, only two, Afghanistan and the Islamic Re-

LIMITED CHANGE

While it is clear that all these factors have contributed to a singular lack of progress toward democracy and civic activism in most of the Arab world, it is also worth noting that important, though halting and inconsistent, inroads toward democratic reform have been made in several Arabic countries. In Algeria, despite the disruptive influence of Islamist terror, the public has voted in large numbers—albeit in flawed elections—to signal their disapproval of terror and violence as a path to power.

In Jordan, the monarch has moved prudently to devolve some power to local government and has established a parliament with limited powers. While there is some space for political parties, civic groups, and unions,

the last year saw chaotic protests by radical opponents of normalization of relations with Israel that resulted in a temporary ban on demonstrations.

Morocco, too, has seen limited relaxation of political restrictions; the king declared in December 2000 his commitment to the establishment of a constitutional democratic monarchy.

In Bahrain, a national referendum in which men and women voted overwhelmingly ratified wide-ranging political reforms that may move the country toward constitutional monarchy. These reforms have been accompanied by the return of opposition figures from exile, the rehiring of those dismissed from state jobs for political reasons, and the creation of a commission to investigate allegations of torture and past human rights violations.

Yemen's limited progress toward democratic reform has been set back by president Saleh's effort to increase executive power and extend his term of office, while marginalizing opposition parties.

At the same time, Kuwait's effort to devolve power has come amid a surge of support for fundamentalists, who seek to reduce the already limited rights of women.

In many settings, fulsome movement toward democratic practice is inhibited by the presence of fanatical Islamist political forces, which seek to use political space and the ballot to attain power in order to establish authoritarian rule.

At the same time, the fear of Islamism has been used by authoritarian governments in Egypt, Malaysia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to suppress legitimate secular democratic forces.

The reality in much of the Islamic world is that democratic secular voices are opposed not only by tyrannical regimes, but also by powerful extremist Islamic political forces, some of them supported by the power of the mosque, which often promotes antidemocratic and anti-Western viewpoints.

The lack of progress for political rights and civil liberties in much of the Islamic world should not suggest that the Islamic world is incapable of rapid momentum toward democratic change. If one examined the political map of the world at the beginning of the 1950s, one might have observed the singular absence of democratic governance among countries with Catholic majorities. At that time, authoritarian governments predominated on the Iberian peninsula, in East Central Europe, in the Philippines, and in most of Latin America. By the 1960s, the attitudes of Catholic clergy and the Catholic hierarchy had begun to shift and the Church increasingly was taking up the causes of the downtrodden and those victimized by oligarchies and tyrannies. These trends reached an apogee under the

leadership of Pope John Paul II, who clearly articulated and reinforced trends supporting such values as human rights, freedom of association, the dignity of the worker, and trade union rights.

All this suggests that religion is not an immutable factor in political change. Rather, religious leaders and clergy seek frequently to be responsive to public sentiments. When public sentiment shifts toward democracy, for example, religious leaders tend to be swept up in the popular mood, even as they seek to put forward transcendent values. This is possible because the great religious traditions are rich in references to the dignity of the individual and are malleable enough to support the project of democratic reform.

Similarly, someone looking at the European political landscape in the late 1980s might have pointed to the fact that the Orthodox Christian states seemed resistant to democratic practice. Now significant reform has been achieved in such protestant states as Bulgaria, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, and democratically elected governments have become the norm in Russia and Ukraine.

It is not to be excluded that similar trends toward democratic change can occur in the coming decades in the Islamic world. Indeed, in one sense, the Arabic countries share one important characteristic with the vast majority of liberal democracies: they are mono-ethnic states with a majority ethnic group representing over two-thirds of the population.

FREEDOM AND ETHNICITY

Just as there are important regional variations in basic freedoms and political systems, there are also noteworthy distinctions between mono-ethnic and multiethnic countries with regard to freedom and democracy. Indeed, democracy is, as a rule, significantly more successful in mono-ethnic societies (that is, societies in which there is a single dominant majority ethnic group representing more than two-thirds of the population) than in ethnically divided and multiethnic states.

When this year's Survey data are examined through the prism of ethnic composition, they offer some revealing findings. For example, of Free countries, 64 (74 percent) have a dominant ethnic majority representing more than two-thirds of the population, while 22 (26 percent) do not. Among Partly Free countries, 23 (40 percent) are mono-ethnic, while 35 (60 percent) are multiethnic or ethnically divided. And among the Not Free states, there are 27 (56 percent) that are mono-ethnic, while 21 (44 percent) are not. In short, a state with a dominant ethnic group is some three times more likely to be Free than a multiethnic state.

The 10 Worst Rated Countries

Afghanistan
Burma
Cuba
Iraq
North Korea
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Turkmenistan

The 2 Worst Rated Disputed Territories

Chechnya (Russia)
Tibet (China)

Similar patterns can be found among the democracies. Of the world's 121 electoral democracies, 79 (65 percent) have a dominant ethnic group and 42 (35 percent) do not. Of the 71 countries that do not have a democratic government, 35 (49 percent) are mono-ethnic and 36 (51 percent) are not.

One reason for this outcome is that in ethnically divided and multiethnic societies, political parties tend to form around ethnic allegiances. This is particularly the case in multiethnic states where ethnic groups are not heterogeneously dispersed throughout the country, but live in specific geographic regions. Many African states fall into this pattern. At the same time, as a rule, in societies where there is a single dominant ethnic group, political mobilization along primarily ethnic lines is less likely and politics tend to divide along the lines of economic and class-based interests. This is the record of the nation-states in much of Western and Central Europe and in most countries in the Americas.

At the same time, it must be said that there are numerous examples of successful multiethnic societies, many of which have a strong tradition of decentralized power, federalism, and protection of ethnic and minority rights, and a strong and vibrant market system open to the participation of a broad range of religious and ethnic communities.

WORST OF THE WORST

There are 48 states that are rated as Not Free and in which a broad range of freedoms are systematically denied. Of these, 28 have majority Islamic populations. Among the Not Free countries, ten states have been given the Survey's lowest rating of 7 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties. The ten worst-rated countries represent a

narrow range of systems and cultures. Two—Cuba and North Korea—are one party Marxist-Leninist regimes. Seven are majority Islamic countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan). The remaining worst-rated state is Burma, a tightly controlled military dictatorship.

There are two worst-rated territories: Tibet (under Chinese jurisdiction) and Chechnya, where an indigenous Islamic population is engaged in a brutal guerrilla war for independence from Russia.

TERROR AND FREEDOM

The end of the Cold War and the more than quarter century-long third wave of democratic expansion contributed to the reduction in perceptible threats to peace and security. Analysts of global conflicts also have pointed to additional positive security-related trends: the absolute decline in major conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s and the virtual disappearance of inter-state conflict.

Now the world faces the emergence of mass terrorism associated with a universalist revolutionary ideology that seeks to create a khilafah, a transnational caliphate, or Islamic regime, governed on the basis of a rigorous and narrow-minded interpretation of Islam. This ideology, which repudiates democracy as an alien Western concept, will pose serious challenges inside established democracies, in new democracies, in countries seeking to reform, and among the world's tyrannies.

In established democracies, efforts to combat terrorism will necessarily require greater intrusiveness by the state in the lives of its citizens, and in particular in the activities of recent immigrants, foreign students, and short-term residents. Yet the deep roots of an independent judiciary in established democracies is likely to ensure that a proper balance between liberty and security is maintained.

In new democracies, weak political institutions will be faced with the challenge of intelligently coping with terrorist threats in the absence of entrenched traditions of respect for civil liberties. In settings just emerging from tyranny, the appeal to authoritarian quick fixes may find added resonance among electorates.

At the same time, there is already ample evidence that the war against terrorism may give already authoritarian regimes a pretext for political repression against opposition groups, whether or not credible links exist to terrorism and extremist movements.

The monstrous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that have claimed thousands of lives in the US are without question a watershed in international affairs. In the coming years, key foreign policy issues and geopolitical alignments will be seen through the prism of that cata-

clysm and the comprehensive war on terrorism triggered by the murderous attack on America.

Yet the resurgence of mass terror on United States soil seems at great odds with the great trends of the last decade: the spread of democracy and the decline in major conflicts. With the impressive expansion of democratic regimes in Latin America, the countries of the former Soviet bloc, and parts of Asia and Africa, many envisioned an era of greater international cooperation. Likewise, many saw in the collapse of Communist ideology the disappearance of transnational ideological rivals to democracy and the free market. Clearly, the promise of democracy has not been destroyed by the events of September 11.

Indeed, the global triumph of the values of democracy and human rights may well be contributing to the irrational fury of revolutionary millenarians, who seek in a series of dramatic acts of evil to reverse history and supplant the natural human instinct for autonomy and dignity with an esoteric ideology of neo-totalitarian control masked in the language of religion.

THE STRUGGLE WITH TERROR

In this context, it would be wrong for the leaders of the democratic community of nations to conclude that the project of promoting the expansion of democracy must be abandoned or suspended in the face of the terrorist and Islamist threat.

Clearly, the proposition that democratic elections are an instant solution to the problems of all struggling societies is inappropriate. There are some societies so deformed and brutalized by decades of repression and terror that the call for immediate elections could lead to the electoral victory of demagogic forces eager to impose their own new forms of tyranny.


But the project of providing to the peoples living in closed societies the benefits of open access to information through uncensored radio and satellite television broadcasting, people-to-people exchanges, and through initiatives that provide access to books on democracy and economic freedom must be intensified.

In addition, support should be given to countries that are seeking to move away from statism in their economic life and to afford their citizens the opportunity to exercise initiative in economic pursuits.

Finally, the international community should expand its commitments to support pro-democratic civic organizations and civil society in repressive settings.

Such initiatives must not be seen as somehow at odds with the anti-terrorist agenda. Rather they should be seen as the mechanisms by which reliable allies of the democratic world and committed opponents of terror-

Freedom and GDP



Category	GDP (USD)	GDP (%)
Free	\$ 27,112,606,168,170	87
Partly Free	\$ 2,037,686,842,400	6
Not Free	\$ 2,229,219,579,600	7
Total GDP	\$ 31,379,512,590,170	

ism and ideological extremism are empowered.

As the battle against terrorism and extremism takes shape, it would be wrong to disregard the fundamental progress made over the last quarter century toward more open and democratic systems. For it is the moral appeal of democratic values and the preponderance of strategic power and economic resources in the emerging global community of democratic states that is the most compelling reason for confidence that the scourge of terrorism will be defeated.

WHY THE FUTURE IS WITH FREEDOM

Despite the vexing challenges posed by mass terrorism, there are convincing reasons to hope that the countries that embody the values of freedom and democracy can prevail. This above all is made clear by the overwhelming advantage that free societies enjoy in terms of their share of the world's resources. Free countries account today for \$27.1 trillion of the world's annual gross domestic product, which represents 87 percent of global economic activity. By contrast, Party Free countries accounted for \$2.0 trillion in output (6 percent) and Not Free countries produced \$2.2 trillion in economic output, representing 7 percent of the globe's GDP.

These vast material and financial resources are a confirmation of the crucial role played by political freedom and the rule of law in spurring economic progress. But this vast reserve of the democratic world's economic power suggests that free countries can prevail in the project of eradicating mass terrorism, of defeating fanatical political movements, and of further expanding the ranks of free and democratic societies.

The prodigious reservoir of economic power, of technological advantage, and of military potential that belong to the democratic world suggest that there is a greater urgency than ever in building an effective coordinated international community of democracies, in which the US plays the leading role. In the current perilous environment,

such a cohesive alliance of states can work in tandem to promote more open political and economic systems, while ensuring much needed foreign aid and investment targeted at countries that respect the rule of law and are moving along the democratic path.

THE SURVEY OF FREEDOM

Freedom in the World is an institutional effort by Freedom House to monitor the progress and decline of political rights and civil liberties in 192 nations and in major related and disputed territories. These year-end reviews of freedom began in 1955, when they were called the Balance Sheet of Freedom and, still later, the Annual Survey of the Progress of Freedom. This program has been issued in a more developed context as a yearbook since 1978. Entitled *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, the 2001-2002 yearbook, which includes lengthy analyses of each country and territory, will be available from Freedom House in April 2002.

The Survey is an evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in the world. The Survey assesses a country's freedom by examining its record in two areas: political rights and civil liberties. A country grants its citizens political rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice and whose leaders can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its citizens' civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights, including gender and family rights, personal freedoms, and freedoms of the press, belief, and association. The Survey rates each country on a seven-point scale for both political rights and civil liberties (1 representing the most free and 7 the least free) and then divides the world into three broad categories: "Free" (countries whose ratings average 1-3); "Partly Free" (countries whose ratings average 3-5.5); and "Not Free" (countries whose ratings average 5.57).

The ratings are not only assessments of the conduct of governments. Rather, they are intended to reflect the reality of daily life. Thus a country with a benign government facing violent forces (for example terrorist movements or insurgencies) hostile to an open society will be graded on the basis of the on-the-ground conditions that determine whether the population is able to exercise its freedoms. The Survey enables scholars and policy makers both to assess the direction of global change annually and to examine trends in freedom over time and on a comparative basis across regions with different political and economic systems.

Since 1989, the Survey project has been a yearlong effort produced by our regional experts, consultants, and human rights specialists. The Survey derives its information from a wide range of sources. Most valued of these are the many human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures around the world who keep us informed of the human rights situation in their countries.

The Survey team is grateful for the advice and input of our Survey of Freedom Advisory Board, consisting of Prof. David Becker, Dartmouth College; Prof. Daniel Brumberg, Georgetown University; Dr. Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution; Prof. Charles Gati, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins; Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, Georgetown University; Thomas Lansner, Columbia University; Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset, George Mason University; Prof. Alexander Motyl, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; Dr. Daniel Pipes, Middle East Quarterly; Prof. Ashutosh Varshney, Columbia University; and Prof. Arthur Waldron, University of Pennsylvania.

Throughout the year, Freedom House personnel regularly conduct fact-finding missions to gain more in-depth knowledge of the political transformations affecting our world. During these weeks-to-month-long investigations, we make every effort to meet a cross-section of political parties and associations, human rights monitors, religious figures, representative of the private sector and trade union movement, academics, and journalists.

This year's Survey Team includes Adrian Karatnycky, the project coordinator, Mick Andersen, Gordon Bardos, Michael Goldfarb, Charles Graybow, Kristen Guida, Edward McMahan, Aili Piano, Arch Puddington, Cindy Shiner, Amanda Schnetzer, Leonard R. Sussman, Kendra Zaharescu, and Orysia Lutsevych.

Table of Countries - Comparative Measures of Freedom

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
Afghanistan	7	7	Not Free
Albania	3 ▲	4 ▲	Partly Free
Algeria	6	5	Not Free
Andorra	1	1	Free
Angola	6	6	Not Free
Antigua and Barbuda	4	2	Partly Free
Argentina	2 ▼	3 ▼	Free
Armenia	4	4	Partly Free
Australia	1	1	Free
Austria	1	1	Free
Azerbaijan	6	5	Partly Free
Bahamas	1	1	Free
Bahrain	6 ▲	5 ▲	Not Free
Bangladesh	3	4	Partly Free
Barbados	1	1	Free
Belarus	6	6	Not Free
Belgium	1	2	Free
Belize	1	2 ▼	Free
Benin	3 ▼	2	Free
Bhutan	7	6	Not Free
Bolivia	1	3	Free
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5	4	Partly Free
Botswana	2	2	Free
Brazil	3	3	Partly Free
Brunei	7	5	Not Free
Bulgaria	1 ▲	3	Free
Burkina Faso	4	4	Partly Free
Burma	7	7	Not Free
Burundi	6	6	Not Free
Cambodia	6	5 ▲	Not Free
Cameroon	6 ▲	6	Not Free
Canada	1	1	Free
Cape Verde	1	2	Free
Central African Republic	5 ▼	5 ▼	Partly Free
Chad	6	5	Not Free
Chile	2	2	Free
China (PRC)	7	6	Not Free
Colombia	4	4	Partly Free
Comoros	6	4	Partly Free
Congo (Brazzaville)	5 ▲	4	Partly Free
Congo (Kinshasa)	6 ▲	6	Not Free
Costa Rica	1	2	Free
Cote d'Ivoire	5 ▲	4 ▲	Partly Free
Croatia	2	2 ▲	Free
Cuba	7	7	Not Free
Cyprus (G)	1	1	Free
Czech Republic	1	2	Free
Denmark	1	1	Free

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
Djibouti	4	5	Partly free
Dominica	1	1	Free
Dominican	2	2	Free
East Timor	5 ▲	3	Partly Free
Ecuador	3	3	Partly free
Egypt	6	6 ▼	Not free
El Salvador	2	3	Free
Equatorial Guinea	6 ▲	7	Not free
Eritrea	7	6 ▼	Not free
Estonia	1	2	Free
Ethiopia	5	5	Partly free
Fiji	4 ▲	3	Partly free
Finland	1	1	Free
France	1	2	Free
Gabon	5	4	Partly free
The Gambia	5 ▲	5	Not free
Georgia	4	4	Partly free
Germany	1	2	Free
Ghana	2	3	Free
Greece	1	3	Free
Grenada	1	2	Free
Guatemala	3	4	Partly free
Guinea	6	5	Not free
Guinea-Bissau	4	5	Partly free
Guyana	2	2	Free
Haiti	6	6 ▼	Partly free
Honduras	3	3	Partly free
Hungary	1	2	Free
Iceland	1	1	Free
India	2	3	Free
Indonesia	3	4	Partly free
Iran	6	6	Not free
Iraq	7	7	Not free
Ireland	1	1	Free
Israel	1	3	Free
Italy	1	2	Free
Jamaica	2	3 ▼	Free
Japan	1	2	Free
Jordan	5 ▼	5 ▼	Partly free
Kazakhstan	6	5	Not free
Kenya	6	5	Not free
Kiribati	1	1	Free
Korea, North	7	7	Not free
Korea, South	2	2	Free
Kuwait	4	5	Partly free
Kyrgyz Republic	6	5	Not free
Laos	7	6	Not free
Latvia	1	2	Free

Table of Countries - Comparative Measures of Freedom

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
Lebanon	6	5	Not Free
Lesotho	4	4	Partly Free
Liberia	6 ▼	6	Not Free
Libya	7	7	Not Free
Liechtenstein	1	1	Free
Lithuania	1	2	Free
Luxembourg	1	1	Free
Macedonia	4	4 ▼	Partly Free
Madagascar	2	4	Partly Free
Malawi	4 ▼	3	Partly Free
Malaysia	5	5	Partly Free
Maldives	6	5	Not Free
Mali	2	3	Free
Malta	1	1	Free
Marshall Islands	1	1	Free
Mauritania	5 ▲	5	Partly Free
Mauritius	1	2	Free
Mexico	2	3	Free
Micronesia	1	2	Free
Moldova	2	4	Partly Free
Monaco	2	1	Free
Mongolia	2	3	Free
Morocco	5	5 ▼	Partly Free
Mozambique	3	4	Partly Free
Namibia	2	3	Free
Nauru	1	3	Free
Nepal	3	4	Partly Free
Netherlands	1	1	Free
New Zealand	1	1	Free
Nicaragua	3	3	Partly Free
Niger	4	4	Partly Free
Nigeria	4	5 ▼	Partly Free
Norway	1	1	Free
Oman	6	5	Not Free
Pakistan	6	5	Not Free
Palau	1	2	Free
Panama	1	2	Free
Papua New Guinea	2	3	Free
Paraguay	4	3	Partly Free
Peru	1 ▲	3	Free
Philippines	2	3	Free
Poland	1	2	Free
Portugal	1	1	Free
Qatar	6	6	Not Free
Romania	2	2	Free
Russia	5	5	Partly Free
Rwanda	7	6	Not Free
St. Kitts and Nevis	1	2	Free

Country	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
St. Lucia	1	2	Free
St. Vincent & Grenadines	2	1	Free
Samoa	2	2	Free
San Marino	1	1	Free
Sao Tome and Principe	1	2	Free
Saudi Arabia	7	7	Not Free
Senegal	3	4	Partly Free
Seychelles	3	3	Partly Free
Sierra Leone	4	5	Partly Free
Singapore	5	5	Partly Free
Slovakia	1	2	Free
Slovenia	1	2	Free
Solomon	4	4	Partly Free
Somalia	6	7	Not Free
South Africa	1	2	Free
Spain	1	2	Free
Sri Lanka	3	4	Partly Free
Sudan	7	7	Not Free
Suriname	1	2	Free
Swaziland	6	5	Not Free
Sweden	1	1	Free
Switzerland	1	1	Free
Syria	7	7	Not Free
Taiwan (Rep. Of China)	1	2	Free
Tajikistan	6	6	Not Free
Tanzania	4	4	Partly Free
Thailand	2	3	Free
Togo	5	5	Partly Free
Tonga	5	3	Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago	3 ▼	3 ▼	Partly Free
Tunisia	6	5	Not Free
Turkey	4	5	Partly Free
Turkmenistan	7	7	Not Free
Tuvalu	1	1	Free
Uganda	6	5	Partly Free
Ukraine	4	4	Partly Free
United Arab Emirates	6	5	Not Free
United Kingdom *	1	2	Free
United States	1	1	Free
Uruguay	1	1	Free
Uzbekistan	7	6	Not Free
Vanuatu	1	3	Free
Venezuela	3	5	Partly Free
Vietnam	7	6	Not Free
Yemen	6 ▼	6	Not Free
Yugoslavia	3 ▲	3 ▲	Partly Free
Zambia	5	4	Partly Free
Zimbabwe	6	6 ▼	Not Free

Table of Disputed Territories - Comparative Measures of Freedom

Country and Territory	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
Armenia/Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh	5	6	Not free
China Tibet	7	7	Not free
Georgia Abkhazia	6	5	Not free
India Kashmir	6	6	Not free
Indonesia West Papua	5 ▲	5	Partly free
Iraq Kurdistan	5 ▲	5 ▲	Not Free
Israel Israeli-Administered territories	6	5	Not free
Palestinian Authority-	5	5 ▲	Not free
Moldova Transdniester	6	6	Not free
Morocco Western Sahara	7	6	Not free
Russia Chechnya	7	7	Not free
Turkey Cyprus (T)	2	2	Free
Yugoslavia Kosovo	6	6	Not free

Table of Related Territories - Comparative Measures of Freedom

Country and Territory	PR	CL	Freedom Rating
China			
Hong Kong	5	3	Partly Free
Macao	6	4	Partly Free
United Kingdom			
Northern Ireland	2	2	Free
United States			
Puerto Rico	1	2	Free

Combined Average Rating - Independent Countries

FREE

1.0

Andorra
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Canada
Cyprus (G)
Denmark
Dominica
Finland
Grenada
Iceland
Ireland
Kiribati
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Marshall Islands
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
San Marino
Sweden
Switzerland
Tuvalu
United States
Uruguay

1.5

Argentina
Belgium
Cape Verde
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Estonia
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Mauritius
Micronesia
Monaco
Palau
Panama
Poland
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and
Grenadines

Sao Tome and Principe
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Suriname
Taiwan
United Kingdom

2.0

Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Chile
Dominican Republic
Greece
Guyana
Israel
Jamaica
Korea, South
Nauru
Peru
Romania
Samoa
Vanuatu

2.5

Bulgaria
Croatia
El Salvador
Ghana
India
Mali
Mexico
Mongolia
Namibia
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Thailand

PARTLY FREE

3.0

Antigua and Barbuda
Brazil
Ecuador
Honduras
Madagascar
Malawi
Moldova
Nicaragua
Trinidad and Tobago
Seychelles

3.5

Bangladesh
Central African Republic

Guatemala
Indonesia
Macedonia
Mozambique
Nepal
Paraguay
Senegal
Sri Lanka

4.0

Armenia
Burkina Faso
Colombia
Georgia
Jordan
Lesotho
Niger
Nigeria
Solomon Islands
Tanzania
Tonga
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

4.5

Albania
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Djibouti
East Timor
Fiji
Gabon
Guinea-Bissau
Kuwait
Morocco
Sierra Leone
Turkey
Ukraine
Zambia

5.0

Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville)
Ethiopia
The Gambia
Malaysia
Mauritania
Russia
Singapore
Togo

5.5

Azerbaijan
Cote d'Ivoire
Uganda

NOT FREE

5.5

Algeria
Chad
Egypt
Guinea
Haiti
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Lebanon
Maldives
Oman
Pakistan
Swaziland
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

6.0

Angola
Belarus
Brunei
Burundi
Cambodia
Eritrea
Iran
Liberia
Qatar
Tajikistan
Zimbabwe

6.5

Bahrain
Bhutan
Cameroon
China (PRC)
Congo (Kinshasa)
Laos
Rwanda
Somalia
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

7.0

Afghanistan
Burma
Cuba
Equatorial Guinea
Iraq
Korea, North
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Turkmenistan

Combined Average Rating - Related Territories

FREE	
1.5	Puerto Rico (United States)
2.0	Northern Ireland (United Kingdom)
PARTLY FREE	
4.0	Hong Kong (China)
5.0	Macao (China)

Combined Average Rating - Disputed Territories

FREE	
2.0	Cyprus (Turkey)
PARTLY FREE	
5.0	Kurdistan (Iraq)
	West Papua (Indonesia)
NOT FREE	
5.5	Abkhazia (Georgia)
5.5	Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia)
5.5	Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories (Israel)
6.0	Israeli-Administered Territories (Israel)
	Kashmir (India)
	Kosovo (Yugoslavia)
	Transnistria (Moldova)
6.5	Western Sahara (Morocco)
7.0	Chechnya (Russia)